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Abstract
We provide a formal, simple and intuitive theory of rational decision mak-
ing including sequential decisions that aect the environment. The theory has
a geometric avor, which makes the arguments easy to visualize and under-
stand. Our theory is for complete decision makers, which means that they
have a complete set of preferences. Our main result shows that a complete
rational decision maker implicitly has a probabilistic model of the environ-
ment. We have a countable version of this result that brings light on the issue
of countable vs nite additivity by showing how it depends on the geome-
try of the space which we have preferences over. This is achieved through
fruitfully connecting rationality with the Hahn-Banach Theorem. The theory
presented here can be viewed as a formalization and extension of the betting
odds approach to probability of Ramsey and De Finetti [Ram31, deF37].
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1 Introduction
We study complete decision makers that can take a sequence of actions to rationally
pursue any given task. We suppose that the task is described in a reinforcement
learning framework where the agent takes actions and receives observations and
rewards. The aim is to maximize total reward in some given sense.
Rationality is meant in the sense of internal consistency [Sug91], which is how
it has been used in [NM44] and [Sav54]. In [NM44], it is proven that preferences
together with rationality axioms and probabilities for possible events imply the
existence of utility values for those events that explain the preferences as arising
through maximizing expected utility. Their rationality axioms are
1. Completeness: Given any two choices we either prefer one of them to the other
or we consider them to be equally preferable;
2. Transitivity: A preferable to B and B to C imply A preferable to C;
3. Independence: If A is preferable to B and t 2 [0; 1] then tA + (1   t)C is
preferable (or equal) to tB + (1  t)C;
4. Continuity: If A is preferable to B and B to C then there exists t 2 [0; 1] such
that B is equally preferable to tA+ (1  t)C.
In [Sav54] the probabilities are not given but it is instead proven that preferences
together with rationality axioms imply the existence of probabilities and utilities.
We are here interested in the case where one is given utility (rewards) and preferences
over actions and then deriving the existence of a probabilistic world model. We put
an emphasis on extensions to sequential decision making with respect to a countable
class of environments. We set up simple axioms for a rational decision maker, which
implies that the decisions can be explained (or dened) from probabilistic beliefs.
The theory of [Sav54] is called subjective expected utility theory (SEUT) and was
intended to provide statistics with a strictly behaviorial foundation. The behavioral
approach stands in stark contrast to approaches that directly postulate axioms that
\degrees of belief" should satisfy [Cox46, Hal99, Jay03]. Cox's approach [Cox46,
Jay03] has also been found [Par94] to need additional technical assumptions in
addition to the common sense axioms originally listed by Cox. The original proof by
[Cox46] has been exposed as not mathematically rigorous and his theorem as wrong
[Hal99]. An alternative approach by [Ram31, deF37] is interpreting probabilities as
fair betting odds.
The theory of [Sav54] has greatly inuenced economics [Sug91] where it has been
used as a description of rational agents. Seemingly strange behavior was explained
as having beliefs (probabilities) and tastes (utilities) that were dierent from those
of the person to whom it looked irrational. This has turned out to be insucient as
a description of human behavior [All53, Ell61] and it is better suited as a normative
theory or design principle in articial intelligence. In this article, we are interested
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in studying the necessity for rational agents (biological or not) to have a probabilis-
tic model of their environment. To achieve this, and to have as simple common
sense axioms of rationality as possible, we postulate that given any set of values (a
contract) associated with the possible events, the decision maker needs to have an
opinion on wether he prefers these values to a guaranteed zero outcome or not (or
equal). From this setting and our other rationality axioms we deduce the existence
of probabilities that explain all preferences as maximizing expected value. There
is an intuitive similarity to the idea of explaining/deriving probabilities as a book-
maker's betting odds as done in [deF37] and [Ram31]. One can argue that the theory
presented here (in Section 2) is a formalization and extension of the betting odds
approach. Geometrically, the result says that there is a hyper-plane in the space of
contracts that separates accept from reject. We generalize this statement, by using
the Hahn-Banach Theorem, to the countable case where the set of hyper-planes (the
dual space) depends on the space of contract. The answers for dierent cases can
then be found in the Banach space theory literature. This provides a new approach
to understanding issues like nite vs. countable additivity. We take advantage of
this to formulate rational agents that can deal successfully with countable (possibly
universal as in all computable environments) classes of environments.
Our presentation begins in Section 2 by rst looking at a fundamental case where
one has to accept or reject certain contracts dening positive and negative rewards
that depend on the outcome of an event with nitely many possibilities. To draw
the conclusion that there are implicit unique probabilistic beliefs, it is important
that the decision maker has an opinion (acceptable, rejectable or both) on every
possible contract. This is what we mean when we say complete decision maker.
In a more general setting, we consider sequential decision making where given
any contract on the sequence of observations and actions, the decision maker must
be able to choose a policy (i.e. an action tree). Note that the actions may aect the
environment. A contract on such a sequence can e.g. be viewed as describing a re-
ward structure for a task. An example of a task is a cleaning robot that gets positive
rewards for collecting dust and negative for falling down the stairs. A prerequisite
for being able to continue to collect dust can be to recharge the battery before run-
ning out. A specialized decision maker that deals only with one contract/task does
not always need to have implicit probabilities, it can suce with qualitative beliefs
to take reasonable decisions. A qualitative belief can be that one pizza delivery com-
pany (e.g. Pizza Hut vs Dominos) is more likely to arrive on time than the other.
If one believes the pizzas are equally good and the price is the same, we will chose
the company we believe is more often delivering on time. Considering all contracts
(reward structures) on the actions and events, leads to a situation where having a
way of making rational (coherent) decisions, implies that the decision maker has
implicit probabilistic beliefs. We say that the probabilities are implicit because the
decision maker, which might e.g. be a human, a dog, a computer or just a set of
rules, might have a non-probabilistic description of how the decisions are made.
In Section 3, we investigate extensions to the case with countably many possible
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outcomes and the interesting issue of countable versus nite additivity. Savage's
axioms are known to only lead to nite additivity while [Arr70] showed that adding
a monotone continuity assumption guarantees countable additivity. We nd that in
our setting, it depends on the space of contracts in an interesting way. In Section
4, we discuss a setting where we have a class of environments.
2 Rational Decisions for Accepting or Rejecting
Contracts
We consider a setting where we observe a symbol (letter) from a nite alphabet and
we are oered a form of bet we call a contract that we can accept or not.
Denition 1 (Passive Environment, Event) A passive environment is a se-
quence of symbols (letters) jt, called events, being presented one at a time. At
time t the symbols j1; :::; jt are available. We can equivalently say that a passive
environment is a function  from nite strings to f0; 1g where (j1; :::; jt) = 1 if and
only if the environment begins with j1; :::; jt.
Denition 2 (Contract) Suppose that we have a passive environment with sym-
bols from an alphabet with m elements. A contract for an event is an element
x = (x1; :::; xm) in Rm and xj is the reward received if the event is the j:th symbol,
under the assumption that the contract is accepted (see next denition).
Denition 3 (Decision Maker, Decision) A decision maker (for some unknown
environment) is a set Z  Rm which denes exactly the contracts that are accept-
able. In other words, a decision maker is a function from Rm to faccepted, rejected,
eitherg. The function value is called the decision.
If x 2 Z and   0 then we want x 2 Z since it is simply a multiple of the same
contract. We also want the sum of two acceptable contracts to be acceptable. If we
cannot lose money we are prepared to accept the contract. If we are guaranteed to
win money we are not prepared to reject it. We summarize these properties in the
denition below of a rational decision maker.
Denition 4 (Rationality I) We say that the decision maker (Z  Rm) is ratio-
nal if
1. Every contract x 2 Rm is either acceptable or rejectable or both;
2. x is acceptable if and only if  x is rejectable;
3. x; y 2 Z, ;   0 then x+ y 2 Z;
4. If xk  0 8k then x = (x1; :::; xm) 2 Z while if xk < 0 8k then x =2 Z.
4
If we want to compare these axioms to rationality axioms for a preference relation
on contracts we will say that x is better or equal (as in equally good) than y if x y
is acceptable while it is worse or equal if x   y is rejectable. The rst axiom is
completeness. The second says that if x is better or equal than y then y is worse
or equal to x. The third implies transitivity since (x  y) + (y   z) = (x  z). The
fourth says that if x has a better (or equal) reward than y for any event, then x is
better (or equal) than y.
2.1 Probabilities and Expectations
Theorem 5 (Existence of Probabilities) Given a rational decision maker,
there are numbers pi  0 that satisfy
fx j
X
xipi > 0g  Z  fx j
X
xipi  0g: (1)
Assuming
P
i pi = 1 makes the numbers unique and we will use the notation Pr(i) =
pi.
Proof. See the proof of the more general Theorem 23. It tells us that the closure Z
of Z is a closed half space and can be written as fx j P xipi  0g for some vector
p = (pi) (since every linear functional on Rm is of the form f(x) =
P
xipi) and not
every pi is 0. The fourth property tells us that pi  0 8i.
Denition 6 (Expectation) We will refer to the function g(x) =
P
pixi from (1)
as the decision makers expectation. In this terminology, a rational decision maker
has an expectation function and accepts a contract x if g(x) > 0 and reject it if
g(x) < 0.
Remark 7 Suppose that we have a contract x = (xi) where xi = 1 for all i. If we
want g(x) = 1, we need
P
pi = 1.
We will write E(x) instead of g(x) (assuming
P
pi = 1) from now on and call it the
expected value or expectation of x.
2.2 Multiple Events
Suppose that the contract is such that we can view the symbol to be drawn as
consisting of two (or several) symbols from smaller alphabets. That is we can write
a drawn symbol as (i; j) where all the possibilities can be found through 1  i  m,
1  j  n. In this way of writing, a contract is dened by real numbers xi;j.
Theorem 5 tells us that for a rational decision maker there exists unique ri;j  0
such that
P
i;j ri;j = 1 and an expectation function g(x) =
P
ri;jxi;j such that
contracts are accepted if g(x) > 0 and rejected if g(x) < 0.
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2.3 Marginals
Suppose that we can take rational decisions on bets for a pair of horse races, while
the person that oers us bets only cares about the rst race. Then we are still
equipped to respond since the bets that only depend on the rst race is a subset of
all bets on the pair of races.
Denition 8 (Marginals) Suppose that we have a rational decision maker (Z) for
contracts on the events (i; j). Then we say that the marginal decision maker for the
rst symbol (Z1) is the restriction of the decision maker Z to the contracts xi;j that
only depend on i, i.e. xi;j = xi. In other words given a contract y = (yi) on the rst
event, we extend that contract to a contract on (i; j) by letting yi;j = yi and then the
original decision maker can decide.
Suppose that xi;j = xi. Then the expectation
P
ri;jxi;j can be rewritten asP
pixi where pi =
P
j ri;j. We write that
Pr(i) =
X
j
Pr(i; j):
These are the marginal probabilities for the rst variable that describe the marginal
decision maker for that variable. Naturally we can also dene a marginal for the
second variable (considering contracts xi;j = xj) by letting qj =
P
i ri;j and Pr(j) =P
i Pr(i; j). The marginals dene sets Z1  Rm and Z2  Rn of acceptable contracts
on the rst and second variables separately.
2.4 Conditioning
Again suppose that we are taking decisions on bets for a pair of horse races, but this
time suppose that the rst race is already over and we know the result. We are still
equipped to respond to bets on the second race by extending the bet to a bet on
both where there is no reward for (pairs of) events that are inconsistent with what
we know.
Denition 9 (Conditioning) Suppose that we have a rational decision maker (Z)
for contracts on the events (i; j). We dene the conditional decision maker Zj=j0
for i given j = j0 by restricting the original decision maker Z to contracts xi;j which
are such that xi;j = 0 if j 6= j0. In other words if we start with a contract y = (yi)
on i we extend it to a contract on (i; j) by letting yi;j0 = yi and yi;j = 0 if j 6= j0.
Then the original decision maker can make a decision for that contract.
Suppose that xi;j = 0 if j 6= j0. The unconditional expectation of this contract
is
P
i;j ri;jxi;j as usual which equals
P
i ri;j0xi;j0 . This leads to the same decisions
(i.e. the same Z) as using
P
i
ri;j0P
k rk;j0
xi;j0 which is of the form in Theorem 5. We
write that
Pr(ijj0) = Pr(i; j0)P
k Pr(k; j0)
=
Pr(i; j0)
Pr(j0)
: (2)
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From this it follows that
Pr(i0)Pr(j0ji0) = Pr(j0)Pr(i0jj0) (3)
which is one way of writing Bayes rule.
2.5 Learning
In the previous section we dened conditioning which lead us to a denition of what
it means to learn. Given that we have probabilities for events that are sequences of
a certain number of symbols and we have observed one or several of them, we use
conditioning to determine what our belief regarding the remaining symbols should
be.
Denition 10 (Learning) Given a rational decision maker, dened by pi1;:::;iT for
the events (it)
T
t=1 and the rst t 1 symbols i1; :::; it 1, we dene the informed rational
decision maker for it by conditioning on the past i1; :::; it 1 and marginalize over the
future it+1; :::; iT . Formally,
P informedit (i) = Pr(iji1; :::; it) =
P
jt+1;:::;jT
pi1;:::;it;jt+1;:::;jTP
jt;:::;jT
pi1;:::;it 1;jt;:::;jT
:
2.6 Choosing between Contracts
Denition 11 (Choosing contract) We say that to rationally prefer contract x
over y is (equivalent) to rationally consider x  y to be acceptable.
As before we assume that we have a decision maker that takes rational decisions on
accepting or rejecting contracts x that are based on an event that will be observed.
Hence there exist implicit probabilities that represent all choices and an expectation
function. Suppose that an agent has to choose between action a1 that leads to
receiving reward xi if i is drawn and action a2 that leads to receiving yi in the case
of seeing i. Let zi = xi yi. We can now go back to choosing between accepting and
rejecting a contract by saying that choosing (preferring) a1 over a2 means accepting
the contract z. In other words if E(x) > E(y) choose a1 and if E(x) < E(y) choose
a2.
Remark 12 We note that if we postulate that choosing between contract x and the
zero contract is the same as choosing between accepting or rejecting x, then being
able to choose between contracts implies the ability to choose between accepting and
rejecting one contract. We, therefore, can say that the ability to choose between a
pair of contracts is equivalent to the ability to choose to accept or reject a single
contract.
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We can also choose between several contracts. Suppose that action ak gives us
the contract xk = (xki )
m
i=1. If E(x
j) > E(xk) 8k 6= j then we strictly prefer aj over
all other actions. In other words a contract xj   xk would for all k be accepted and
not rejected by a rational decision maker.
Remark 13 If we have a rational decision maker for accepting or rejecting con-
tracts, then there are implicitly probabilities pi for symbol i that characterize the
decisions. A rational choice between actions ak leading to contracts x
k is taken by
choosing action
a = argmax
k
X
i
pix
k
i : (4)
2.7 Choosing between Environments
In this section, we assume that the event that the contracts are concerned with
might be aected by the choice of action.
Denition 14 (Reactive environment) An environment is a tree with symbols
jt (percepts) on the nodes and actions at on the edges. We provide the environment
with an action at at each time t and it presents the symbol jt at the node we arrive
at by following the edge chosen by the action. We can also equivalently say that a
reactive environment  is a function from strings a1j1; :::; atjt to f0; 1g which equals
1 if and only if  would produce j1; :::; jt given the actions a1; :::; at.
We will dene the concept of a decision maker for the case where one decision
will be taken in a situation where not only the contract, but also the outcome can
depend on the choice. We do this by dening the choice as being between two
dierent environments.
Denition 15 (Active decision maker) Consider a choice between having con-
tract x for passive environment env1 or contract y for passive environment env2. A
decision maker is a set Z  Rm1  Rm2 which denes exactly the pairs (x; y) for
which we choose env1 with x over env2 with y.
Denition 16 (Rational active choice) To choose between action a1 with con-
tract x and a2 with contract y in a situation where the action may aect the event,
we consider two separate environments, namely the environments that result from
the two dierent actions. We would then have a situation where we will have one
observation from each environment. Preferring a1 with x to a2 with y is (equivalent)
to consider x  y to be an acceptable contract for the pair of events.
Remark 17 Denition 16 means that a1 with x is preferred over a2 with y if a1
with x  y is preferred over a2 with the zero contract.
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Proposition 18 (Probabilities for reactive setting) Suppose that we have a
reactive environment and a rational active decision maker that will make one choice
between action a1 and a2 as described in Denitions 15 and 16, then there exist
pi  0 and qi  0 such that action a1 with contract x is preferred over action a2
with contract y if
P
pixi >
P
qiyi and the reverse if
P
pixi <
P
qiyi. This means
that the decision maker acts according to probabilities Pr(ja1) and Pr(ja2).
Proof. Let ~Z be all contracts that when combined with action a1 is preferred
over a2 with the zero contract. Theorem 1 guarantees the existence of pi such thatP
pixi > 0 implies that x 2 ~Z and
P
pixi < 0 implies that x =2 ~Z. The same
way we nd qi that describe when we prefer a2 with y to a1 with the zero contract.
That these probabilities (pi and qi) explain the full decision maker as stated in the
proposition now follows directly from Denition 16 understood as in Remark 17.
Suppose that we are going to make a sequence of T < 1 decisions where at
every point of time we will have a nite number of actions to chose between. We
will consider contracts, which can pay out some reward at each time step and that
can depend on everything (actions chosen and symbols observed) that has happened
up until this time and we want to maximize the accumulated reward at time T .
We can view the choice as just making one choice, namely choosing an action
tree. We will sometimes call an action tree a policy.
Denition 19 (Action tree) An action tree is a function from histories of sym-
bols j1; :::; jt and decisions a1; :::; at 1 to new decisions, given that the decisions were
made according to the function. Formally,
f(a1; j1; :::; at 1; jt 1) = at:
An action tree will assign exactly one action for any of the circumstances that
one can end up in. That is, given the history up to any time t < T of actions and
events, we have a chosen action. We can, therefore, choose an action tree at time
0 and receive a total accumulated reward at time T . This brings us back to the
situation of one event and one rational choice.
Denition 20 (Sequential decisions) Given a rational decision maker for the
events (jt)
T
t=1 and the rst t   1 symbols j1; :::; jt 1 and decisions a1; :::; at 1, we
dene the informed rational decision maker at time t by conditioning on the past
a1; j1:::; at 1; jt 1.
Proposition 21 (Beliefs for sequential decisions) Suppose that we have a re-
active environment and a rational decision maker that will take T < 1 decisions.
Furthermore, suppose that the decisions 0  t < T have been taken and resulted in
history a1; j1:::; at 1; jt 1. Then the decision makers preferences at this time can be
explained (through expected utility maximization) by probabilities
Pr(jt; :::; jT ja1; j1:::; at 1; jt 1; at; at+1:::; aT ):
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Proof. Denition 20 and Proposition 18 immediately lead us to the conclusion
that given a past up to a point t   1 and a policy for the time t to T we have
probabilistic beliefs over the possible future sequences from time t to T and the
choice is categorized by maximizing expected accumulated reward at time T .
3 Countable Sets of Events
Instead of a nite set of possible outcomes, we will in this section assume a countable
set. We suppose that the set of contracts is a vector space of sequences xk; k =
0; 1; 2; ::: where we use pointwise addition and multiplication with scalar. We will
dene a space by choosing a norm and let the space consist of the sequences that
have nite norm as is common in Banach space theory. If the norm makes the
space complete it is called a Banach sequence space [Die84]. Interesting examples
are `1 of bounded sequences with the maximum norm k(k)k1 = max jkj, c0 of
sequence that converges to 0 equipped with the same maximum norm and `p which
for 1  p <1 is dened by the norm
k(k)kp = (
X
jkjp)1=p:
For all of these spaces we can consider weighted versions (wk > 0) where
k(k)kp;wk = k(kwk)kp:
This means that  2 `p(w) i (kwk) 2 `p, e.g.  2 `1(w) i supk jkwkj < 1.
Given a Banach (sequence) space X we use X 0 to denote the dual space that consists
of all continuous linear functionals f : X ! R. It is well known that a linear
functional on a Banach space is continuous if and only if it is bounded, i.e. that
there is C < 1 such that jf(x)jkxk  C 8x 2 X. Equipping X 0 with the norm
kfk = sup jf(x)jkxk makes it into a Banach space. Some examples are (`1)0 = `1,
c00 = `
1 and for 1 < p < 1 we have that (`p)0 = `q where 1=p + 1=q = 1. These
identications are all based on formulas of the form
f(x) =
X
xipi
where the dual space is the space that (pi) must lie in to make the functional
both well dened and bounded. It is clear that `1  (`1)0 but (`1)0 also contains
\stranger" objects.
The existence of these other objects can be deduced from the Hahn-Banach
theorem (see e.g. [Kre89] or [NB97]) that says that if we have a linear function
dened on a subspace Y 2 X and if it is bounded on Y then there is an extension
to a bounded linear functional on X. If Y is dense in X the extension is unique
but in general it is not. One can use this Theorem by rst looking at the subspace
of all sequences in `1 that converge and let f() = limk!1 k. The Hahn-Banach
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theorem guarantees the existence of extensions to bounded linear functionals that
are dened on all of `1. These are called Banach limits. The space (`1)0 can be
identied with the so called ba space of bounded and nitely additive measures with
the variation norm kk = jj(A) where A is the underlying set. Note that `1 can be
identied with the smaller space of countably additive bounded measures with the
same norm. The Hahn-Banach Theorem has several equivalent forms. One of these
identies the hyper-planes with the bounded linear functionals [NB97].
Denition 22 (Rationality II) Given a Banach sequence space X of contracts,
we say that the decision maker (subset Z of X dening acceptable contracts) is
rational if
1. Every contract x 2 X is either acceptable or rejectable or both;
2. x is acceptable if and only if  x is rejectable;
3. x; y 2 Z, ;   0 then x+ y 2 Z;
4. If xk  0 8k then x = (xk) is acceptable while if xk > 0 8k then x is not
rejectable.
Theorem 23 (Linear separation) Suppose that we have a space of contracts X
that is a Banach sequence space. Given a rational decision maker there is a positive
continuous linear functional f : X ! R such that
fx j f(x) > 0g  Z  fx j f(x)  0g: (5)
Proof. The third property tells us that Z and  Z are convex cones. The second
and fourth property tells us that Z 6= Rm. Suppose that there is a point x that
lies in both the interior of Z and of  Z. Then the same is true for  x according
to the second property and for the origin. That a ball around the origin lies in Z
means that Z = Rm which is not true. Thus the interiors of Z and  Z are disjoint
open convex sets and can, therefore, be separated by a hyperplane (according to
the Hahn-Banach theorem) which goes through the origin (since according to the
second and fourth property the origin is both acceptable and rejectable). The rst
two properties tell us that Z [  Z = Rm. Given a separating hyperplane (between
the interiors of Z and  Z), Z must contain everything on one side. This means
that Z is a half space whose boundary is a hyperplane that goes through the origin
and the closure Z of Z is a closed half space and can be written as fx j f(x)  0g
for some f 2 X 0. The fourth property tells us that f is positive.
Corollary 24 (Additivity) 1. If X = c0 then a rational decision maker is de-
scribed by a countably additive (probability) measure.
2. If X = `1 then a rational decision maker is described by a nitely additive
(probability) measure.
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It seems from Corollary 24 that we pay the price of losing countable additivity
for expanding the space of contracts from c0 to `
1 but we can expand the space
even more by looking at c0(w) where wk ! 0 which contains `1 and X 0 is then
`1((1=wk)). This means that we get countable additivity back but we instead have
a restriction on how fast the probabilities pk must tend to 0. Note that a bounded
linear functional on c0 can always be extended to a bounded linear functional on
`1 by the formula f(x) =
P
pixi but that is not the unique extension. Note also
that every bounded linear functional on `1 can be restricted to c0 and there be
represented as f(x) =
P
pixi. Therefore, a rational decision maker on `
1 contracts
has probabilistic beliefs (unless pi = 0 8i), though it might also take asymptotic
behavior of a contract into account. For example (and here pi = 0 8i), the decision
maker that makes decisions based on asymptotic averages limn!1 1n
Pn
i=1 xi when
they exist. That strategy can be extended to all of `1 (a Banach limit). The
following proposition will help us decide which decision maker on `1 is described
with countably additive probabilities.
Proposition 25 Suppose that f 2 (`1)0. For any x 2 `1, let xji = xi if i  j and
xji = 0 otherwise. If for any x,
lim
j!1
f(xj) = f(x);
then f can be written as f(x) =
P
pixi where pi  0 and
P1
i=1 pi <1.
Proof. The restriction of f to c0 gives us numbers pi  0 such that
P1
i=1 pi < 1
and f(x) =
P
pixi for x 2 c0. This means that f(xj) =
Pj
i=1 pixi for any x 2 `1
and j <1. Thus limj!1 f(xj) =
P1
i=1 pixi.
Denition 26 (Monotone decisions) We dene the concept of a monotone deci-
sion maker in the following way. Suppose that for every x 2 `1 there is N <1 such
that the decision is the same for all xj; j  N (See Proposition 25 for denition) as
for x. Then we say that the decision maker is monotone.
Example 27 Let f 2 `1 be such that if limk ! L then f() = L (i.e. f is
a Banach limit). Furthermore dene a rational decision maker by letting the set
of acceptable contracts be Z = fx j f(x)  0g. Then f(xj) = 0 (where we use
notation from Proposition 25) for all j < 1 and regardless of which x we dene
xj from. Therefore, all sequences that are eventually zero are acceptable contracts.
This means that this decision maker is not monotone since there are contracts that
are not acceptable.
Theorem 28 (Monotone rationality) Given a monotone rational decision
maker for `1 contracts, there are pi  0 such that
P
pi <1 and
fx j
X
xipi > 0g  Z  fx j
X
xipi  0g: (6)
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Proof. According to Theorem 23 there is f 2 (`1)0 such that (the closure of
Z) Z = fxj f(x)  0g . Let pi  0 be such that
P
pi < 1 and such that
f(x) =
P
xipi for x 2 c0. Remember that xj (notation as in Proposition 25) is
always in c0. Suppose that there is x such that x is accepted but
P
xipi < 0. This
violate monotonicity since there exist N <1 such thatPni=1 xipi < 0 for all n  N
and, therefore, xj is not accepted for j  N but x is accepted. We conclude that if
x is accepted then
P
pixi  0 and if
P
pixi > 0 then x is accepted.
4 Rational Agents for Classes of Environments
We will here study agents that are designed to deal with a large range of situations.
Given a class of environments we want to dene agents that can learn to act well
when placed in any of them, assuming it is at all possible.
Denition 29 (Universality for a class) We say that a decision maker is uni-
versal for a class of environments M if for any outcome sequence a1j1a2j2::: that
given the actions would be produced by some environment in the class, there is c > 0
(depending on the sequence) such that the decision maker has probabilities that sat-
isfy
Pr(j1; :::; jtja1; :::; at)  c 8t:
This is obviously true if the decision maker's probabilistic beliefs are a convex com-
bination
P
2Mw, w > 0 and
P
 w = 1.
We will next discuss how to dene some large classes of environments and agents
that can succeed for them. We assume that the total accumulated reward from
the environment will be nite regardless of our actions since we want any policy to
have nite utility. Furthermore, we assume that rewards are positive and that it is
possible to achieve strictly positive rewards in any environment. We would like the
agent to perform well regardless of which environment from the chosen class it is
placed in.
For any possible policy (action tree)  and environment , there is a total reward
V  that following  in  would result in. This means that for any  there is a contract
sequence (V  ) , assuming we have enumerated our set of environments. Let
V  = max

V  :
We know that V  > 0 for all . Every contract sequence (V

 ) lies in X =
`1((1=V  )) and k(V  )kX  1. The rational decision makers are the positive, con-
tinuous linear functionals on X. X 0 contains the space `1(V  ). In other words if
w  0 and
P
wV

 <1 then the sequence (w) denes a rational decision maker
for the contract space X. These are exactly the monotone rational decision makers.
Letting (which is the AIXI agent from [Hut05])
 2 argmax

X

wV

 (7)
13
we have a choice with the property that for any other  withX

wV

 <
X

wV

 :
Hence the contract (V 

   V  ) is not rejectable. In other words  is strictly
preferable to . By letting p = wV

 , we can rewrite (7) as
 2 argmax

X

p
V 
V 
: (8)
If one further restricts the class of environments by assuming V   1 for all  then
for every , (V  ) 2 `1. Therefore, by Theorem 28 the monotone rational agents for
this setting can be formulated as in (7) with (w) 2 `1, i.e.
P
 w < 1. However,
since (p) 2 `1, a formulation of the form of (8) is also possible. Normalizing p and
w individually to probabilities makes (7) into a maximum expected utility criterion
and (8) into maximum relative utility. As long as our w and p relate the way they
do it is still the same decisions. If we would base both expectations on the same
probabilistic beliefs it would be dierent criteria. When we have an upper bound
V  < b <1 8 we can always translate expected utility to expected relative utility
in this way, while we need a lower bound 0 < a < V  to rewrite an expected relative
utility as an expected utility. Note, the dierent criteria will start to deviate from
each other after updating the probabilistic beliefs.
4.1 Asymptotic Optimality
Denote a chosen countable class of environments by M. Let V ;k be the rewards
achieved after time k using policy  in environment . We suppress the dependence
on the history so far. Let
W ;k =
V ;k
V ;k
denote the skill (relative reward) of  in environment  from time k. The maximum
possible skill is 1. We would like to have a policy  such that
lim
k!1
W ;k = 1 8 2M:
This would mean that the agent asymptotically achieve maximum skill when placed
in any environment from M. Let I(hk; ) = 1 if  is consistent with history hk and
I(hk; ) = 0 otherwise. Furthermore, let
p;k =
p;0P
2M p;0I(hk; )
be the agent's weight for environment  at time k and let p be a policy that at
time k acts according to a policy in
argmax

X

p;k
V ;k
V ;k
: (9)
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In the following theorem, we prove that for every environment  2M, the policy
p will asymptotically achieve perfect relative rewards. We have to assume that there
exists a sequence of policies k > 0 with this property (as for the similar Theorem
5.34 in [Hut05] which dealt with discounted values). The convergence in W -values
is the relevant sense of optimality for our setting, since the V -values converge to
zero for any policy.
Theorem 30 (Asymptotic optimality) Suppose that we have a decision maker
that is universal (i.e. p > 0 8) with respect to the countable class M of environ-
ments (which can be stochastic) and that there exists policies k such that for all
, W k;k ! 1 if  is the actual environment (or the sequence is consistent with ).
This implies that W 
p;
k ! 1 where  is the actual environment.
The proof technique is similar to that of Theorem 5.34 in [Hut05].
Proof. Let
0  1 W k;k =: k ; k =
X

p;k
k
 : (10)
The assumptions tells us that k = W
k;
k   1 ! 0 for all  that are consistent
with the sequence (p;k = 0 if  is inconsistent with the history at time k) and since
k  1 , it follows that
k =
X

p;k
k
 ! 0:
Note that p;k(1   W p;k ) 
P
 p;k(1   W p;k) 
P
 p;k(1   W kk;) =P
p;k
k
 = 
k. Since we also know that p;k  p;0 > 0 it follows that
(1 W p;k )! 0.
5 Conclusions
We studied complete rational decision makers including the cases of actions that may
aect the environment and sequential decision making. We set up simple common
sense rationality axioms that imply that a complete rational decision maker has
preferences that can be characterized as maximizing expected utility. Of particular
interest is the countable case where our results follow from identifying the Banach
space dual of the space of contracts.
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